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Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic market where a ¯xed number of ¯rms en-
gages in Cournot oligopoly. Firms choose the output level based on their assess-
ment of the competitors' reaction to their output choice. This is parameterized
using an approach reminiscent of conjectural variations. On a second level ¯rms
adapt their conjectural variation by imitating the most successful ¯rm. Sim-
ulations suggest that in the long-run the Walrasian, Cournot-Nash and cartel
equilibria survive. The theory of nearly-complete decomposability is used to
show that the Walrasian equilibrium is approximately the only stochastically
stable state.
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11 Introduction
The question under which conditions collusion or cartel formation in oligopolistic
markets is possible is an important issue in the theory of industrial organisation. It
is particularly interesting for anti-trust policies. There are several ways in which the
issue has been addressed in the literature. The static Cournot or Bertrand models
don't allow for a cooperative outcome. Experimental evidence, e.g. by Friedman
(1967), Axelrod (1984), and O®erman et al. (2002), suggests that cooperation or
cartel formation (tacit collusion) does arise in oligopolistic markets.
In the literature many contributions try to explain sustainability of tacit collu-
sion. For most of these models it holds that extensions to the basic static model
are needed in order to get cooperation as a possible equilibrium outcome, e.g. by
assuming incomplete information or asymmetries in the ¯rms' technologies. There
is, however, a very simple way of obtaining a collusive outcome in the static model,
namely by introducing conjectural variations, a concept that dates back to Bowley
(1924). This approach assumes that ¯rms take into account the reaction of the mar-
ket to their own quantity choice. For example, the standard best-reply dynamics
is compatible with conjectural variations stating that the market does not respond
to one's own actions. The problem is that conjectural variations are essentially a
dynamic concept, but are mostly used in a static environment. Kalai and Stanford
(1985) show that there are repeated game formulations of Cournot markets that
can result in beliefs in the spirit of conjectural variations without abandoning full
rationality. In a recent paper Friedman and Mezzetti (2002) show how conjectural
variations can be used in an oligopoly model. They consider a di®erentiated prod-
uct market with boundedly-rational, price-setting ¯rms that at each point in time
maximise their pro¯t over an in¯nite time horizon based on a conjectural variation.
These authors also study an adaptation process of the conjectural variation where
adaptation takes place if the observed price change is substantially larger than the
price change predicted by the conjectural variation. They show that under certain
conditions the Nash equilibrium always constitutes a stable steady-state. Further-
more, as substitutability among ¯rms increases, a more cooperative outcome can be
sustained as a stable steady-state. In the limit (perfect substitutability) this leads
to full cooperation.
An important step in the evolution of economic thinking has been the interest
of economists for the theory of evolution applied to economic phenomena. Several
contributions to the literature have set o® the development of this ¯eld. First there is
the concept of bounded rationality introduced by Herbert Simon (cf. Simon (1957)).
The bounded rationality approach replaces the assumption of full rationality of
2economic agents. Secondly, in neo-classical economics the objective of agents is to
maximise some absolute quantity (e.g. utility or pro¯t), whereas Alchian (1950)
already pointed out that relative payo®s are often of more interest.
In this paper, the concept of stochastic stability introduced by Foster and Young
(1990) is used to analyse an oligopoly model with boundedly rational ¯rms which
are ultimately interested in relative pro¯ts. The ¯rst paper in industrial organisa-
tion which applies the concept of stochastic stability is Vega-Redondo (1997). He
considers a Cournot oligopolistic market where ¯rms choose their quantity level by
imitating the most successful ¯rm, i.e. the ¯rm that makes the highest pro¯t. He
shows that the unique stochastically stable state is given by the Walrasian equilib-
rium. This model has been extended by Al¶ os-Ferrer et al. (1999) by allowing for
entry and exit. They ¯nd that if there are decreasing returns to scale, then the mar-
ket will eventually settle in a Walrasian equilibrium. In case of increasing returns
to scale, a monopoly will arise eventually.
As mentioned before, an experimental study by O®erman et al. (2002) shows that
not only the Walrasian equilibrium may survive in a Vega-Redondo framework, but
also the collusive (cartel) equilibrium. This experimental evidence seems to suggest
that the behavioural assumptions in Vega-Redondo (1997) are too restrictive. There
are attempts in the literature to construct models with more behavioural rules.
For example, Schipper (2003) models myopic optimisers (best-repliers) and pro¯t
imitators µ a la Vega-Redondo (1997). He ¯nds that the market eventually converges
to a situation where the myopic optimisers play a best-reply to the imitators and
the imitators play a semi-Walrasian quantity taking into account the existence of
the best-repliers. In this model, neither the Walrasian equilibrium nor the cartel
outcome is obtained. Kaarb¿e and Tieman (1999) use a similar model to show that
in supermodular games a Nash equilibrium is always selected in the limit.
In all the papers mentioned above agents either cannot change their behaviour,
or changing behaviour is modelled as an exogenous random process. The model
presented in this chapter gives more °exibility to the behavioural assumptions un-
derlying the results of these papers by endogenising the behavioural choice. It is
assumed that ¯rms base their quantity choice in a boundedly rational way on obser-
vations from the past and on their conjectures about competitors' reactions to their
behaviour. The latter aspect is modelled by using a variable that measures the {
supposed { immediate reaction of others to one's own actions. The quantity dynam-
ics is then modelled in such a way that a ¯rm chooses the quantity that maximises
next period's pro¯t given the quantity choices of the previous period and its own
conjecture. Hence, at the quantity level, ¯rms are assumed to be myopic optimisers.
This quantity dynamics is extended with random noise to capture aspects of the
3quantity choice that are not explained by the model. One can think for example of
experimentation by ¯rms which leads to a di®erent quantity choice than would be
expected from myopic optimisation. The noise part can also be interpreted as ¯rms
making mistakes in their myopic optimisation process. It might also capture the
fact that a ¯rm is replaced by a new ¯rm that has the same conjecture, but starts
with another quantity choice. The last aspect re°ects what biologists call mutation.
It may happen that after some time a ¯rm realises that it is making less pro¯t
than its competitors. In such a case, its conjecture is apparently not correct. In
such cases, ¯rms adapt their conjecture. They make this decision in a boundedly
rational way, namely by imitating the conjecture of the ¯rm that has the highest
pro¯t. This dynamics is called the conjecture dynamics. Here too a random noise
term is added to capture experiments, mistakes or mutations. By allowing evolution
at the behavioural level this paper is related to the literature on indirect evolution
(cf. GÄ uth and Yaari (1992)). The main di®erence is that in this paper it is not
assumed that given a behavioural pattern agents act rationally. Boundedly rational
behaviour enters here at both the behavioural and the quantity-setting level.
The quantity dynamics and the conjecture dynamics, together with the noise
terms, lead to an ergodic Markov chain having a unique invariant probability mea-
sure. A simulation study is conducted to study the behaviour of this Markov chain.
It is found that the cartel, Cournot-Nash, and Walrasian equilibria are played more
frequently than other quantities. Furthermore, in the long-run the Walrasian equi-
librium gets played more often.
To see if the Walrasian equilibrium can theoretically be supported as the most
likely long-run outcome of the model, we look at the stochastically stable states of
the Markov chain. The stochastically stable states are the states in the support of
the unique invariant probability measure of the limit Markov chain when the error
probabilities for both the quantity dynamics and the conjecture dynamics converge
to zero. Due to the complexity of the dynamics it is not possible to get analytical
results on the stochastically stable states. However, by construction of the model
the Markov chain can be decomposed in a chain that governs the quantity dynamics
and a chain that describes the conjecture dynamics. It is shown that { given the
conjectures { the quantity dynamics has a unique invariant probability measure.
The Markov chain is then aggregated over the quantity level using this measure
and a Markov chain is obtained that is solely based on the conjecture dynamics.
It is shown that this aggregated Markov chain has a unique invariant probability
measure. The theory of nearly-complete decomposability as developed by Simon
and Ando (1961), Ando and Fisher (1963) and Courtois (1977) provides conditions
under which the invariant measure of the aggregated chain is an approximation of
4the invariant measure of the original chain.
Following this path of analysis it is obtained that the market will eventually settle
in the Walrasian equilibrium, just like in Vega-Redondo (1997). So, even with the
more elaborate behavioural structure of this model, the Walrasian equilibrium is still,
by approximation, the only stochastically stable state. This results from the fact
that imitative behaviour drives cooperative behaviour out, just as in Vega-Redondo
(1997) pro¯t imitation drives out cooperative quantity setting. This result only
holds, however, if the frequency of the conjecture dynamics is su±ciently low. Then,
the quantity dynamics has time to settle in its equilibrium. Otherwise, anything can
happen, although the simulations suggest that the dynamics mainly evolves around
the cartel, Cournot-Nash and Walrasian equilibria.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 the model is formally introduced.
Section 3 presents a simulation study, whereas in Section 4 the model is analysed
analytically. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Let be given a dynamic market for a homogeneous good with n ¯rms, indexed by
In = f1;2;:::;ng. At each point in time, t 2 I N, competition takes place in a
Cournot fashion, i.e. by means of quantity setting. Inverse demand is given by a
smooth function P : I R+ ! I R+ satisfying P0(¢) < 0. The production technology
is assumed to be the same for each ¯rm and is re°ected by a smooth cost function
C : I R+ ! I R+, satisfying C0(¢) > 0. If at time t 2 I N the vector of quantities is
given by q 2 I Rn
+, the pro¯t for ¯rm i 2 In at time t is given by
¼(qi;q¡i) = P(qi + Q¡i)qi ¡ C(qi);
where q¡i = (qj)j6=i and Q¡i =
P
j6=i qj.
Each ¯rm i 2 In chooses quantities from a ¯nite grid ¡i. De¯ne ¡ =
Q
i2In ¡i.
For further reference let q(k), k = 1;:::;m, be the k-th permutation of ¡. It is
assumed that in setting their quantities ¯rms conjecture that their change in quantity
results in an immediate change in the total quantity provided by their competitors.
This can also be seen to re°ect the ¯rm's conjecture of the competitiveness of the
market. Formally, ¯rm i 2 In conjectures a value for the partial derivative of Q¡i
with respect to qi. Using this conjecture, the ¯rm wants to maximise next period's
pro¯t. Hence, the ¯rm is a myopic optimiser, which re°ects its bounded rationality.







qi + P(qi + Q¡i) ¡ C0(qi) = 0: (1)
5As can be seen from eq. (1) we assume that there is only a ¯rst order conjecture
e®ect. Furthermore, we assume that it is linear. These assumptions add to the
¯rm's bounded rationality.1
To facilitate further analysis, the conjectures are parameterised by a vector ® 2








Given a vector of conjectures an equilibrium for the market is given by q 2 I Rn
+ such
that for all i 2 In the ¯rst-order condition (1) is satis¯ed. Note that if all ¯rms
i 2 In have a conjecture ®i = ¡1, the equilibrium coincides with the Walrasian
equilibrium. Furthermore, if all ¯rms have ®i = 2¡n
n or ®i = 1, the equilibrium
coincides with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium or the cartel equilibrium, respectively.
Therefore, the conjectures ®i = ¡1, ®i = 2¡n
n , and ®i = 1 will be called the
Walrasian, Cournot-Nash, and cartel conjectures, respectively.
Each ¯rm chooses its conjecture from a ¯nite grid ¤ on [¡1;1], where it is
assumed that ¤ ¾ f¡1; 2¡n
n ;1g. The bounds of this ¯nite grid represent the extreme
cases of full competition (® = ¡1) and cartel (® = 1). For further reference, let
®(I), I = 1;:::;N, be the I-th permutation of ¤n =
Q
i2In ¤.
The dynamics of the market takes place in discrete time and consists of both
a quantity dynamics and a conjecture dynamics. The quantity dynamics works as
follows. At the beginning of period t 2 I N, each ¯rm gets the opportunity to revise
its output with probability 0 < p < 1. The output is chosen so that it maximises
this period's pro¯t based on last period's quantities and the ¯rm's conjecture. That
is, ¯rm i 2 In seeks to ¯nd qt
i 2 ¡i so as to approximate as closely as possible the
¯rst-order condition from eq. (1), i.e. qt
i 2 B(qt¡1
¡i ;®t¡1
i ), where for q¡i 2
Q
j6=i ¡j




¯ ¯P0(q + Q¡i)(1 + ®i)
n
2





If there are ties, ¯rm i chooses any quantity from B(qt¡1
¡i ;®t¡1
i ) using a probability
measure ´i(¢) with full support. The dynamics described above constitutes the pure
quantity dynamics. The actual quantity choice can be in°uenced by several other
aspects. For example, a ¯rm can experiment and choose another quantity. Another
possibility is that ¯rms make mistakes in their optimisation process. Finally, a ¯rm
may be replaced by a new ¯rm that has the same conjecture, but sets a di®erent
1The ¯rst-order and linearity assumptions are also made throughout the static literature on
conjectural variations. This seems incompatible with the assumption of fully rational ¯rms in these
models.
6quantity to start with. This is what biologists refer to as mutation. To capture these
e®ects we assume that each ¯rm experiments or makes a mistake with probability
" > 0 and chooses any quantity from ¡i using a probability measure ºi(¢) with
full support. Given a conjecture vector ®(I) for some I 2 f1;:::;Ng and an error
probability ", the quantity dynamics gives rise to a Markov chain on ¡ with transition
matrix M"





















where 1 1(¢) denotes the indicator function and the part between square brackets gives
the transition probabilities for the pure quantity dynamics.
The conjecture dynamics takes place at the end of period t, when each ¯rm i
gets the opportunity to revise its conjecture with probability 0 < ~ p < 1. The idea
behind this revision is that once in a while a ¯rm analyses its past performance
and it assesses the correctness of its conjecture by looking at the performance of
the other ¯rms. It is assumed that each ¯rm can observe the individual quantity
choices of its competitors and therefore it can also deduce the conjectures that its
competitors use. It can then imitate the ¯rm that made the highest pro¯t in period
t. Since deriving the conjectures requires e®ort we assume that ¯rms change their
conjecture less often than their quantity choice which is re°ected in assuming that
~ p < p.2 Formally, ¯rm i's choice ®t
i is such that ®t
i 2 ~ B(®t¡1;qt), where for given
® 2 ¤n and q 2 ¡,
~ B(®;q) = argmax
°2¤
n
9j2In : ®j = °;8k2In : ¼(qj;q¡j) ¸ ¼(qk;q¡k)
o
:
If there are ties, ¯rm i chooses any element from ~ B(®t¡1;qt) using a probability
measure ~ ´i(¢) with full support. This dynamic process is called the pure conjecture
dynamics. As in the quantity dynamics we allow for mistakes or experimentation.
So, each ¯rm chooses with probability ~ " > 0 any conjecture using a probability
measure ~ ºi(¢) with full support. For each k 2 f1;:::;mg and corresponding quantity
vector q(k), and error probability ~ ", the conjecture dynamics gives rise to a Markov
chain on ¤n with transition matrix ¸~ "
k. The transition probability from ®(I) to ®(J)
2One could argue that since the ¯rm can derive its competitors' conjectures it can always opti-
mally react. However, it would have to gather more information than just quantity choices. This
requires e®ort and, hence, costs. Therefore, we assume that conjecture updating takes place less






















where the part between square brackets gives the transition probabilities for the
pure conjecture dynamics.
The combined quantity and conjecture dynamics yield a Markov chain on ¡£¤n
with transition matrix Q";~ ". Entries in this transition matrix are grouped according
to the conjecture index. So, the k-th row in Q";~ " consists of the transition probabili-
ties from the state with conjectures ®(1) and quantities q(k). The m¤(I ¡1)+k-th
row contains the transition probabilities from the state with conjectures ®(I) and
quantities q(k). A typical element of Q";~ " is given by
Q";~ "(kI;lJ) = M"
I(k;l)¸~ "
k(I;J); (4)
which should be read as the transition probability form the state with conjectures
®(I) and quantities q(k) to the state with conjectures ®(J) and quantities q(l).
3 A Simulation Study
Since for all i 2 In, the probability distributions ºi(¢) and ~ ºi(¢) have full support, the
Markov chain Q";~ " is ergodic and, hence, has a unique invariant probability measure.
To gain some insight in the long-run behaviour of the Markov chain a simulation
study has been conducted. The demand side of the market is described by an inverse
demand function given by
P(Q) = 45 ¡
p
3Q:
It is assumed that all ¯rms have access to the same technology which is represented




This description is the same as the one used in the experiment conducted by O®er-
man et al. (2002). The focus in that paper is on the frequencies of the Walrasian
(full competition), Cournot-Nash, and cartel quantities, respectively. The Walrasian
quantity, denoted by qw, solves the inequality
P(nqw)qw ¡ C(qw) ¸ P(nqw)q ¡ C(q) 8q 2 I R+:
The Cournot-Nash (qn) and cartel (qc) quantities solve
P(nqn)qn ¡ C(qn) ¸ P((n ¡ 1)qn + q)q ¡ C(q) 8q 2 I R+;
8and
P(nqc)qc ¡ C(qc) ¸ P(nq)q ¡ C(q) 8q 2 I R+;
respectively. Following O®erman et al. (2002) and taking n = 3 ¯rms, these quan-
tities are given by qw = 100, qn = 81, and qc = 56:25, respectively. The Walrasian,
Cournot-Nash, and cartel conjectures equal ¡1,¡1=3, and 1, respectively.
For the simulation, the quantity grid for all ¯rms is taken to be ¡ = f49;50;:::;108g
and the quantity grid is set to ¤ = f¡1;¡1
3;1g. This implies that the state space is
5,832,000 dimensional. The probabilities of quantity and conjecture adaptation are
set to p = 0:9 and ~ p = 0:4, respectively. We simulate 200 runs of 150 time periods.
For each simulation the error probabilities " and ~ " are iid uniformly drawn from the
interval [0:001;0:2].
The frequencies of the conjectures and the running frequencies of the aggregate
quantities are shown in Figure 1. The running frequency for quantity Q has window
size four, i.e. it is the frequency of all observations in the set fQ¡4;Q¡3;:::;Q+4g.
As can be seen from this ¯gure, the Walrasian quantity has the highest frequency,
















































Figure 1: Frequencies of conjectures (left panel) and running frequencies of aggregate
quantities (right panel).
with two other peaks at the Cournot-Nash quantity and the cartel quantity. The
frequencies of the conjectures chosen paint a similar picture.
If the sample is split into short-run (¯rst 50 periods of each run) and long-run
(last 50 periods of each run) data, the frequencies are as depicted in Figures 2 and
3. These ¯ndings show that all three equilibria are being played in the long-run. If
we look at prices, one of the simulation runs led to a price-run depicted in Figure 4.
This price-run stays very close to O®erman et al. (2002) who report that both the















































Figure 2: Short-run frequencies of conjectures (left panel) and running frequencies
of aggregate quantities (right panel).

















































Figure 3: Long-run frequencies of conjectures (left panel) and running frequencies
of aggregate quantities (right panel).














Figure 4: Simulated prices.
cartel and Walrasian equilibria occur approximately half of the time. In Figure 4
one can see that the cartel price prevails in the ¯rst half of the run, whereas the
Walrasian price prevails in the second half.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show an interesting feature, namely that the Walrasian equi-
librium is played more frequently in the long-run than in the short-run. In the next
section we provide theoretical evidence that the Walrasian equilibrium has, approxi-
mately, the largest basin of attraction when the error probabilities converge to zero.
In fact, the Walrasian is the only state that has a basin of attraction in this limiting
case.
4 A Theoretical Analysis
For each " and ~ " the chain Q";~ " is ergodic, hence there is a unique invariant proba-
bility measure. In line with other papers on stochastic stability (cf. Kandori et al.
(1993), Young (1993), and Vega-Redondo (1997)) we are interested in the long-run
behaviour of the dynamics when evolution has forced the probabilities of mistakes
to zero. The standard argument for considering this limiting case is that ¯rms learn
to play the game better as time evolves. That is, we are interested in the (unique)







The support of ¹(¢) constitutes the set of stochastically stable states. Note that,
contrary to the standard literature we have two levels of evolution in this model. Due
to the complexity of the combined dynamics, one cannot determine ¹(¢) exactly. It
turns out, however, that we can ¯nd an approximation, ~ ¹(¢), of this measure which
can be analysed.
As a point of departure the ¯rst level of evolution, the quantity dynamics, is
studied. For each I = 1;:::;N, let MI = lim
"#0
M"
I be the limit Markov chain when
the error in the quantity dynamics converges to zero. Note that MI has a unique
invariant probability measure, say ¹I(¢). To facilitate further analysis it is assumed
that for any vector of conjectures there is a unique equilibrium, i.e. a unique vector
of quantities that solves eq. (1) for all ¯rms. Furthermore, we assume that this
equilibrium is an element of the quantity grid ¡.










i ) = 0:
Let the permutation on ¡ that corresponds to q® be denoted by k(I), i.e. q(k(I)) =
q®. The following proposition states that for each vector of conjectures ®(I) the
unique stochastically stable state of the quantity dynamics is given by q®(I).
Theorem 1 Let I 2 f1;:::;Ng be given. Under Assumption 1, the unique invari-
ant probability measure ¹I(¢) of the Markov chain with transition matrix MI is such
that
¹I(q®(I)) = 1:
Proof. The proposition is proved using the theory developed by Milgrom and
Roberts (1991). First note that for all i 2 In, ¡i is a compact subset of I R+. De¯ne
for all i 2 In the (continuous) function ~ ¼i : I R+ £ I Rn¡1
+ ! I R+, given by
~ ¼i(qi;q¡i) = ¡
¯ ¯ ¯P0(qi + Q¡i)(1 + ®i(I))
n
2
qi + P(qi + Q¡i) ¡ C0(qi)
¯ ¯ ¯:
Consider the normal-form game hIn;(¡i)i2In;(~ ¼i)i2Ini. Let S ½ ¡, denote by Si the
projection of S on ¡i and de¯ne S¡i =
Q
j6=i Sj. For all i 2 In the set of undominated




¯ ¯ ¯8y2Si9q¡i2S¡i : ~ ¼i(qi;q¡i) ¸ ~ ¼i(y;q¡i)
o
:
3The order of limits is crucial in the results to be proved. First evolution drives the error
probability of the quantity dynamics to zero and after that the error probability for the conjecture
dynamics. Since it is assumed that quantity adaptation takes places more frequent than conjecture
adaptation (~ p < p), this is a straightforward assumption.
12Let U(S) =
Q





k ¸ 2, where U1(S) = U(S). Note that since q®(I) is unique we have
U1(¡) = fq®(I)g:
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1991) we say that fqtgt2I N is consistent with adap-
tive learning if
8^ t2I N9¹ t>^ t8~ t¸¹ t : q
~ t 2 U
¡
fqsj^ t · s < ~ tg
¢
:
Let ^ t 2 I N, take ¹ t = ^ t + 1 and let ~ t = ¹ t + k for some k 2 f0;1;2;:::g. Then
fqsj^ t · s < ~ tg = fqsjs = ^ t;:::;¹ t + k ¡ 1g:
Let fqtgt2I N be generated by the pure quantity dynamics, i.e. the quantity dynamics
without the experimentation (or mutation) part. Then we have by de¯nition




¡i ) ¸ ~ ¼i(y;q
~ t¡1
¡i ):
Furthermore, it holds that q
~ t¡1 2 fqsj¹ t · s < ~ tg. Hence, we can conclude that
fqtgt2I N is consistent with adaptive learning. From Milgrom and Roberts (1991,
Theorem 7) one obtains that kqt ¡ q®(I)k ! 0 as t ! 1. Since ¡ is ¯nite we have
9¹ t2I N8t¸¹ t : qt = q®(I):
So, fq®(I)g is the only recurrent state of the (mutation-free) pure quantity dynamics.
From Young (1993) we know that the stochastically stable states are among the
recurrent states of the mutation-free dynamics. Hence, ¹I(q®(I)) = 1. ¤
Before we turn to Theorem 2, the following lemma is introduced, which plays a
pivotal role its proof. It compares the equilibrium pro¯ts for di®erent conjectures.
Suppose that the market is in a monomorphic state, i.e. all ¯rms have the same
conjecture. The question is what happens to equilibrium pro¯ts if k ¯rms deviate
to another conjecture. If n ¡ k ¯rms have a conjecture equal to ® and k ¯rms have






















The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B. Lemma 1 plays a similar role
as the claim in Vega-Redondo (1997, p. 381). The main result in that paper is driven
by the fact that if at least one ¯rm plays the Walrasian quantity against the other
¯rms playing another quantity, the ¯rm with the Walrasian quantity has a strictly
13higher pro¯t. In our model the dynamics is more elaborate. Suppose that all ¯rms
have the Walrasian conjecture and that the quantity dynamics is in equilibrium, i.e.
the Walrasian equilibrium. If at least one player has another conjecture not only its
own equilibrium quantity changes, but also the equilibrium quantities of the ¯rms
that still have the Walrasian conjecture. Lemma 1 states that the ¯rms with the
lower conjecture still have the highest equilibrium pro¯t. This is intuitively clear
form the ¯rst-order condition (1). The ¯rms with the lower conjecture increase their
production until the di®erence between the price and the marginal costs reaches a
lower, but positive, level than the ¯rms with the higher conjecture. Therefore, the
total pro¯t of having a lower conjecture is higher. This happens because the ¯rms do
not realise that in the future their behaviour will be imitated by other ¯rms which
puts downward pressure on industry pro¯ts.
Some additional notation and assumptions are needed in the following. For
a matrix A let ¸j(A) denote the j-th largest eigenvalue in absolute value of A.
Furthermore, de¯ne ¸k(I;J) = lim
~ "#0
¸~ "








The following assumptions are made.
Assumption 2 All elementary divisors of Q are linear.








Since the probability measures ºi(¢) and ~ ºi(¢) have full support for all i 2 In, all
eigenvalues of Q will generically be distinct and, hence, Assumption 2 will generically
be satis¯ed. Let ®(1) be the monomorphic state where all ¯rms have the Walrasian
conjecture, i.e. ®(1) = (¡1;:::;¡1) We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1{3 hold. Then there exists an ergodic
Markov chain on ¤n with transition matrix ~ Q and unique invariant probability mea-
sure ~ ¹(¢). For ~ ¹(¢) it holds that ~ ¹(q®(1)) = 1. Furthermore, ~ ¹(¢) is an approximation
of ¹(¢) of order O(³).
Proof. The approximation result follows from the theory of nearly-complete de-
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¸k(I;J)MI(k;l) if I 6= J
¡
P
K6=I ¸k(I;K)MI(k;l) if I = J:
Note that Q = Q¤ + ³C. So, the transition matrix Q has been decomposed into a
block diagonal matrix Q¤, where each diagonal block is the transition matrix for the
quantity dynamics of a given vector of conjectures, and a matrix that re°ects the
conjecture dynamics. The constant ³ can be interpreted as the maximum degree of
coupling between subsystems MI.
Given the result of Theorem 1 one can aggregate Q using ¹I(¢) in the following




























Note that the transition matrix ~ Q is the limit of a sequence of ergodic Markov
chains with transition matrices ~ Q~ " with ~ Q~ "(I;J) = ¸~ "
k(I)(I;J). So, ~ Q has a unique
invariant probability measure ~ ¹(¢). Under Assumptions 2 and 3 the matrix Q is
nearly-completely decomposable. From Courtois (1977, Section 3.2) this directly
implies that ~ ¹(¢) is an O(³) approximation of ¹(¢).
The result on ~ ¹(¢) is obtained by using the techniques developed by Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984). First we establish the set of recurrent states for the mutation-free
dynamics of ~ Q~ ". This is the dynamics without the experimentation part and is
thus equal for all ~ " > 0. From (3) one can see that the transition probabilities for
this dynamics are equal to the transition probabilities of going from one vector of
conjectures ®(I) to another vector ®(J) given that the current quantity vector is
the equilibrium q®(I). So, the dynamics of ~ Q~ " is the pure conjecture dynamics if the
quantity dynamics gets su±cient time to settle in equilibrium. Let the transition
matrix for this aggregated pure conjecture dynamics be denoted by ~ Q0.
Lemma 2 The set A of recurrent states for the aggregated mutation-free conjecture




¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
:
15The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix C. De¯ne the costs between












¢. The cost between ®(I) and ®(J) is
the minimum number of mutations from ®(I) that is needed for the pure conjecture
dynamics to have positive probability of reaching ®(J). Let ® 2 ¤n. An ®-tree H®
is a collection of ordered pairs (®0;®00) such that:
1. every ®0 2 ¤nnf®g is the ¯rst element of exactly one pair;
2. for all ®0 2 ¤nnf®g there exists a path (®0;®1),(®1;®2),:::,(®s¡1;®s), (®s;®)
in H®.





First, we build an ®(1)-tree H¤ with minimal costs. Then it is shown that for any
state ® 2 Anf®(1)g and any ®-tree H® the costs will be higher. From Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984, Lemma 6.3.1) one can then conclude that ®(1) is the unique element
in the support of ~ ¹(¢). Young (1993) has shown that the minimum cost tree is among
the ®-trees where ® is an element of a recurrent class of the mutation-free dynamics.
Thus, from Lemma 2 we know that we only need to consider the monomorphic states
in A. This implies that for all ®-trees H®, ® 2 A, we have c(H®) ¸ jAj ¡ 1, since
one always needs at least one experiment to leave a monomorphic state.
Consider ®(1) and the ®(1)-tree H¤ that is constructed in the following way.
Let ® 2 Anf®(1)g. For all i 2 In we have ®i > ®i(1). Suppose that one ¯rm i
experiments to ®i(1) = ¡1, while the other ¯rms cannot revise their output. Ac-
cording to Lemma 1 with k = 1 this ¯rm has a higher pro¯t in quantity equilibrium
than the other ¯rms. If one period later all other ¯rms j 6= i get the opportunity
to revise their conjectural variation (which happens with positive probability) they
will all choose ®j(1) = ¡1. Hence, one mutation su±ces to reach ®(1) and therefore
c(H¤) = jAj ¡ 1.
Conversely, let H® be an ®-tree for some ® 2 Anf®(1)g. Then somewhere in
this tree there is a path between ®(1) and a monomorphic state ®0 with ®0
i > ¡1
for all i 2 In. Suppose that starting from ®(1) one ¯rm i experiments to ®0
i. From
Lemma 1 with k = n ¡ 1 it is obtained that ¯rm i has a strictly lower pro¯t than
the other ¯rms in quantity equilibrium. So, to drive the system away from ®(1) to
®0 at least two mutations are needed. Hence, c(H®) > c(H¤). ¤
16Theorem 2 gives a result on the convergence of market interaction to the Wal-
rasian equilibrium that is similar to the result of Vega-Redondo (1997). Apparently,
pro¯t imitation is such a strong force that it also drives this more elaborate be-
havioural model to the Walrasian equilibrium. Note, however, that the result in
Theorem 2 is an approximation. It might well be that the support of ¹(¢) consists
of more states than just the Walrasian equilibrium. This is actually suggested by
the simulations in Section 3.
A crucial assumption is the one on the maximum degree of coupling between
subsystems MI, ³, as stated in Assumption 3. This parameter should not be too
large. Intuitively, this condition requires that the interaction between subsystems
MI is su±ciently low, i.e. that the conjecture dynamics does not happen too fre-
quent. In Proposition 1 a su±cient condition on ~ p is given for Assumption 3 to
hold.
Proposition 1 If ~ p < 1 ¡
¡3
4
¢1=n, then Assumption 3 is satis¯ed.
Proof. Let I 2 f1;2;:::;Ng. From Bauer et al. (1969) we obtain an upper bound






























where v1(MI) is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of MI. Since
MI is a stochastic matrix we have that
v1
i (MI) = ¹I
i = 1 1(q=q®(I)):






































= MI(k(I);k(I)) = 1.
The maximum of the second term on the right hand side of (6) is attained for













since q(k(I)) is a best response to q(k(I)). Hence, we ¯nd that ¸2(MI) · 1
2 for all






































f(1 ¡ ~ ")(1 ¡ ~ p) + ~ "~ ºi(®i(I))g:
Therefore, we conclude that




f(1 ¡ ~ ")(1 ¡ ~ p) + ~ "~ ºi(®i(I))g
= 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ~ p)n <
1
4






which proves the proposition. ¤
5 Discussion
The model presented in this chapter extends existing evolutionary models of e.g.
Vega-Redondo (1997), Schenk-Hopp¶ e (2000) and Schipper (2003) by allowing for
dynamics at two levels. We model quantity dynamics based on myopic optimisation
by ¯rms that includes the conjectured market response to the ¯rm's own quantity-
setting behaviour which is modelled by means of a conjecture parameter. At a
second level, we allow ¯rms to change or adapt their behaviour in the sense that
they can change their conjecture. This decision is also modelled to be boundedly
18rational. Firms look at their competitors and imitate the behaviour of the most
successful ¯rm.
The main conclusion of Theorem 2 is that if behavioural adjustment takes place
at a su±ciently lower rate than quantity adjustment, the market ends up in the Wal-
rasian equilibrium in the long-run. To be more precise, the Walrasian equilibrium is
the only outcome that will be observed a signi¯cant amount of time in the long-run.
A su±cient condition for this result to hold is that the conjecture dynamics occurs
at a su±ciently low frequency. A simulation study shows that in the long-run also
the cartel and Cournot-Nash equilibria can arise at a signi¯cant frequency. The
main point of Theorem 2 is, however, that even with more elaborate behavioural
dynamics than e.g. Vega-Redondo (1997), evolution still selects the Walrasian equi-
librium. The appeal of this equilibrium lies in the fact that if behaviour is guided
by pro¯t imitation, i.e. relative payo®s, this leads to spitefulness in a ¯rm's actions.
This in turn leads to selection of the Walrasian equilibrium.
An important feature of our model that triggers the result of Theorem 2 is the
fact that we model an explicit dynamic process where ¯rms learn from the past. This
induces them to adapt their behaviour if their pro¯t falls behind their competitors'
pro¯ts. This contrasts, for example, standard repeated games where time plays an
implicit role. To quote Vives (1999): in a "pure repeated game framework[...]history
matters only because ¯rms threaten it to matter". Therefore, a cartel outcome can
be sustained as an equilibrium in such models. The combination of time having
an explicit role and boundedly rational ¯rms has important consequences for the
long-run outcome of market interaction since it avoids folk theorem-like results and
instead pins down a unique equilibrium outcome.
Appendix
A Nearly-Complete Decomposability
This appendix is based on Courtois (1977). Intuitively, a nearly-complete decom-
posable system is a Markov chain where the matrix of transition probabilities can
be divided into blocks such that the interaction between blocks is small relative to
interaction within blocks. In the remainder let Q be an n£n irreducible stochastic
matrix. The dynamic process (yt)t2I N, where yt 2 I Rn for all t 2 I N, is then given by
(yt+1)> = (yt)>Q: (A.1)
Note that Q can be written as follows:
Q = Q¤ + ³C; (A.2)























I, I = 1;:::;N, are irreducible stochastic matrices of order n(I).
Hence n =
PN
I=1 n(I). Therefore the sums of the rows of C are zero. We choose ³






















where the kI denotes the k-th element in the I-th block. The parameter ³ is called
the maximum degree of coupling between subsystems Q¤
I.
It is assumed that all elementary divisors4 of Q and Q¤ are linear. Then the









¸(kI) is the kI-th maximal eigenvalue in absolute value of Q, v(kI) is the corre-
sponding eigenvector normalised to one using the vector norm k¢k1, and s(kI) is the
condition number s(kI) = v(kI)>v(kI). Since Q is a stochastic matrix, the Perron-
Frobenius theorem gives that the maximal eigenvalue of Q equals 1. Therefore, (A.3)
can be rewritten as









4See e.g. Lancaster and Tismentetsky (1985).
20If one de¯nes for each matrix Q¤
I in a similar way Z¤(kI), s¤(kI), ¸¤(kI), and v¤(kI),
e.g. ¸¤(kI) is the k-th maximal eigenvalue in absolute value of Q¤
I, then one can ¯nd










using the fact that v¤
kI(1I) = n(I)¡1 for all kI. The behaviour through time of yt
and y¤






are therefore also speci¯ed by (A.4) and (A.5). The behaviour of yt can be seen
as long-run behaviour whereas y¤
t describes short-run behaviour. The comparison
between both processes follows from two theorems as proven by Simon and Ando
(1961).
Theorem A.1 For an arbitrary positive real number », there exists a number ³»
such that for ³ < ³»,
max
p;q jZpq(kI) ¡ Z¤
pq(kI)j < »;
for any 2 · k · n(I), 1 · I · N, where 1 · p;q · n.
Theorem A.2 For an arbitrary positive real number !, there exists a number ³!














It can be shown that for all I = 1;:::;N, ¸(1I) is close to unity. Therefore
¸t(1I) will also be close to unity for small t. Hence, the ¯rst two terms on the
right-hand side of eq. (A.4) will not vary much for t < T2, for some T2 > 0.
The ¯rst term of the right-hand-side of (A.5) does not change at all. Hence, for
t < T2 the behaviour through time of yt and y¤
t is determined by the last terms of
Qt and (Q¤)t, respectively. Also, if " ! 0 it can be shown that ¸(kI) ! ¸¤(kI)
and from Theorem A.1 it follows that Z(kI) ! Z¤(kI), for all k = 2;:::;n(I) and
I = 1;:::;N. This means that for ³ small and t < T2 the paths of yt and y¤
t are
very close.
21The eigenvalues ¸¤(kI) are strictly less than unity in absolute value for all k =
2;:::;n(I), and I = 1;:::;N. For any positive real number »1 we can therefore













¯ < »1 for t > T¤
1:











¯ < »1 for t > T1:
Theorem A.1 plus convergence of the eigenvalues with ³ then ensures that T1 ! T¤
1
as ³ ! 0. We can always choose ³ such that T2 > T1. As long as ³ is not identical
to zero it holds that ¸(1I) is not identical to unity for I = 2;:::;N.5 Therefore,









¯ ¯ ¯ < »3 for t > T3:
This implies that for T2 < t < T3, the last term of Qt is negligible and the path of
yt is determined by the ¯rst two components of Qt. According to Theorem A.2 it
holds that for any I and J the elements of Z(1K),
ZkI1J(1K);:::;ZkIlJ(1K);:::;ZkIn(J)J(1K);
depend essentially on I, J and l, and are almost independent of k. So, for any I
and J they are proportional to the elements of the eigenvector of Q¤
J corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue. Since Q¤ is stochastic and irreducible, this eigenvector
corresponds to the unique invariant probability measure ¹¤
J of the Markov chain with
transition matrix Q¤
J. Thus, for T2 < t < T3 the elements of the vector yt, (ylJ)t,
will approximately have a constant ratio that is similar to that of the elements of ¹¤
J.
Finally, for t > T3 the behaviour of yt is almost completely determined by the ¯rst
term of Qt. So, yt evolves towards v(11), which corresponds to the unique invariant
probability measure ¹ of the Markov chain with transition matrix Q. Summarising,
the dynamics of yt can be described as follows.
1. Short-run dynamics: t < T1. The predominant terms in Qt and (Q¤)t are the
last ones. Hence, yt and y¤
t evolve similarly.
2. Short-run equilibrium: T1 < t < T2. The last terms of Qt and (Q¤)t have
vanished while for all I, ¸t(1I) remains close to unity. A similar equilibrium
is therefore reached within each subsystem of Q and Q¤.
5If ³ = 0, all blocks QI are irreducible and then we would have ¸(1I) = ¸
¤(1I) = 1 for all I.
223. Long-run dynamics: T2 < t < T3. The predominant term in Qt is the second
one. The whole system moves to equilibrium, while the short-run equilibria in
the subsystems are approximately maintained.
4. Long-run equilibrium: t > T3. The ¯rst term of Qt dominates. Therefore, a
global equilibrium is attained.
The above theory implies that one can estimate ¹(¢) by calculating ¹¤
I for I =
1;:::;N, and the invariant measure ~ ¹ of the process
(~ yt+1)> = (~ yt)>P; (A.7)
where (~ yI)t =
Pn(I)
k=1(ykI)t for all I = 1;:::;N, and some transition matrix P. For
t > T2 we saw that
(ykI)t
(~ yI)t ¼ ¹¤
I;k. Hence, the probability of a transition from group
I to group J is given by

















So, by taking P = [pIJ], the process in (A.7) gives a good approximation for t > T2
of the entire process (yt)t2I N. It is shown in Courtois (1977, Section 2.1) that the
error of this approximation is of order O(³).
Until now we have not been concerned by how large ³ can be. It was stated
that for T¤
1 < t < T2, the original system Q is in a short-run equilibrium close to
the equilibrium of the completely decomposable system Q¤. If this is to occur it
must hold that T¤
1 < T2. Every matrix Q can be written in the form of eq. (A.2),
but not for all matrices it holds that T ¤
1 < T2. Systems that satisfy the condition
T¤
1 < T2 are called nearly-complete decomposable systems (cf. Ando and Fisher
(1963)). Since T¤
1 is independent of ³ and T2 increases with ³ ! 0, the condition is
satis¯ed for ³ su±ciently small. It is shown in Courtois (1977, Section 3.2) that a









B Proof of Lemma 1
Since all ¯rms are identical and solutions to the ¯rst-order conditions are unique,





































k ) = 0:


























. There are two possible cases:
1. if C0(q®
k) ¸ C0(q®0
k ), then (B.1) immediately gives a contradiction;
2. if C0(q®
k) < C0(q®0































¸ 1 and 1+®0
1+® < 1 this gives
a contradiction.
According to the mean-value theorem there exists a q 2 (q®
k;q®0
k ) such that
C0(q) =
C(q®0

































which proves the lemma. ¤
C Proof of Lemma 2
Given a monomorphic state, the pure conjecture dynamics remains in the same
monomorphic state with probability one. So A ¾
©
f(®;:::;®)g
¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
. Conversely,
let ® 2 ¤nnA. With positive probability all ¯rms may adjust their conjecture and





¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
;
which proves the lemma. ¤
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